DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 214 835 SO 013 966

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TITLE Education, Society, and the Teaching of Values.
PUB DATE 12 Aug 81
NOTE 56p.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Bibliographies; *Developmental Psychology; *Educational Methods; *Educational Philosophy; Elementary Secondary Education; *Learning Processes; Moral Development; Psychoeducational Methods; *School Role; Social Development; Social Psychology; Teacher Role; Theories; Values; Values Clarification
IDENTIFIERS Bruner (Jerome S); Gagne (Robert M); Kohlberg (Lawrence); Piaget (Jean)

ABSTRACT

Various approaches to educational philosophy and developmental psychology are described. The purpose of the monograph was to review educational philosophy and developmental psychology in relation to educational methodology. The paper is presented in five sections. Section one, the introduction, explains the role of schools in transmitting social values and notes the importance of educational philosophy in this function. Section two defines ten schools of philosophical thought and briefly comments on methodological requirements for applying them to teaching/learning environments. The philosophies include pragmatism, experimentalism, instrumentalism, progressivism, essentialism, existentialism, and authoritarianism. Section three reviews theories of development that are important in helping educators to understand how children learn and, therefore, to choose appropriate methodologies. The author reviews developmental theories of Jean Piaget, Jerome Bruner, Robert Gagne, and Sidney Bijou and Donald Baer. Social development is also discussed in terms of moral development and values clarification. Sections four and five give a brief summary and a bibliography of 62 references. (AV)

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Education, Society, and the Teaching of Values

by

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August 12, 1981

This writing reviews educational philosophy and developmental psychology mindful of educational methodology.

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SP 013966

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INTRODUCTION

Seldom have I researched a topic with so much related literature that ultimately provided so imprecise a conclusion. This appears to be a problem shared by many as witnessed by the wealth of both consistent and conflicting literature regarding the subject. Though values has for years been the subject of philosophical discussion, psychological experimentation, and sociological adaptation, a clear and concise definition to which most people would readily agree seems to be continually evasive.

This is not to say that basic elements which influence the development of values has yet to be agreed upon. Indeed there are numerous theories regarding cognitive development, social development, and personality development (due to the scope of this writing, the psychoanalytical aspect of personality development will be omitted). To avoid redundancy, only a few pertinent developmental theories will be presented herein (with some mention of those that contain slight variations).

In view of this country's "recent affiliation with decadence" (viz., Vietnam, and Watergate), society has attacked the schools with renewed vigor regarding the teaching of values. However this has been complicated due to the pluralistic nature of our society. The demand by numerous ethnic groups for the inclusion of certain courses (espousing their ethnic values) within the curriculum bears witness to this. Even the dominant ethnic group in our society is not in total agreement. Some are in favor of teaching values (e. g., the continuance and expansion of private schools) while others feel that the teaching of values should be done in the home

and church and that the schools have no business in this area.

Although this writing is not specifically concerned with pluralism, it is an aspect of our society that I must acknowledge as real and one that will ultimately influence the "what" and "how" of values education. For example, values practiced by one ethnic group may appear prejudicial and discriminatory toward another ethnic group. It is difficult indeed to discuss values without discussing prejudice and discrimination, especially when the discussion is pertinent to a society as pluralistic as ours. However, occasion dictates that I attempt to do so. Therefore the reader is referred to Banks (1979), Havighurst and Neugarten (1975), and Hurwitz, Jr. and Tesconi, Jr. (1973) for a more thorough discussion of prejudice; and for a discussion of morals in the interracial classroom see Cochrane and Manley-Casimir (1980).

Finally, I must elaborate on the rationale used during the research prior to this writing. The majority of this writing will be of a descriptive nature, however conclusions will be drawn from this in which my own philosophy concerning values education will be espoused. It may appear, on the surface, that this writing is more oriented toward psychology than philosophy; this is not necessarily true. Having researched the philosophies of individuals such as Plato, Aristotle, Dewey, Jesus of Nazareth, Socrates, Confucious, Budda, Pestoalozzi, Rousseau, et al., it becomes quite clear that although these people are for the most part, thought of as philosophers, their thinking underlies particular methodologies which implies certain concepts regarding psychological development (or how

people learn).

Take, for example, Jesus of Nazareth. With regard to his methodologies, Jesus

> tried to clarify his teachings by means of the question-and-answer method. He also made use of stories drawn from actual life situations. . . .
>
> First and foremost, he was usually positive rather than negative. [It was] in his skillful use of the stimulating technique of question and answer together with a penetrating analysis [that] prepared the way for his own higher synthesis, . . . he was also very critical of tradition and mere rote; and, since he was never afraid to raise controversial issues, he was profoundly creative. . . . His use of hyperbole or rhetorical overstatement, often with a most delicate and subtle coloring of humor, is also striking (Matt. 7:4; 23:24). Above all else, however, he was the master of the parable. . . .
>
> Furthermore, Jesus avoided the false dualism of learner versus subject matter. Both the learner and the precious truth to be learned are important and demand due respect. Finally, he also made use . . . of dramatic action. (Munk, 1965, pp. 25, 29-30)

In teaching his philosophies, the methods used involved a psychological understanding for those surrounding him. Therefore, it may be said even of the philosophers, who were constantly in search of the "what" (philosophical), that to espouse their truths required an understanding of the "how" (psychological) people learn.

Although educational philosophy has dictated what is to be taught at various times in our history, it is psychology that has been concerned with

how it is to be accomplished. Therefore, the two cannot be justifiably separated in a discussion as pervasive as that which applies to values (this concept will be discussed later). On-the-one-hand, "what" are values (philosophical), and on-the-other-hand, "how" are they to be taught (psychological).

In the past, the "what" has usually been established with little regard as to "how" these ideologies were to be pursued. This usually met with success due to the relative stability of society. However, I must agree with Rogers (1967) et al., that "if there is one truth about modern man, it is that he lives in an environment which is constantly changing." (p. 41) In light of this, I have chosen to pursue the "how" from which the "what" will be concluded (although the "what" will be presented first).

The School, Society, and Educational Philosophy

> Since public schools are social institutions ordained to carry out certain functions deemed appropriate by the dominant groups in the society in which they operate, it is not surprising that schools reflect the professed beliefs, values, and ideals of the dominant groups. Schools also mirror the unprofessed values—that is, the values revealed in the actual behavior of the controlling groups. (Hurwitz, Jr. & Tesconi, Jr., 1973, p. 7)

As witnessed by the statement above, the school plays no small role in the conveyance of values. Throughout our history there have been numerous schools of thought, or philosophies, that have advocated certain values that were considered to be of utmost importance with respect to

education and societal preservation. Their influence on the school's instructional methodologies as well as the content of the curriculum has been by no means small.

Although the credit for various philosophies have been, and still are, attributed to respective thinkers (e. g., Sartre with Existentialism), they are by no means limited to these philosophers.

> In a relatively stable, homogeneous society, there is little controversy surrounding the tasks and functions of the school. . . . although there may be disagreement about how well the school is functioning relative to these basic tasks, there is virtually no controversy over what the tasks and functions ought to be.
>
> On the other hand, a society pervaded by rapid social and cultural change—encountering vast and unanticipated social complexities of population growth, urbanization, and largescale technology; wrenched by racial and age-gap strife—will produce conflicting ideas and beliefs about the tasks and functions of the school.
>
> Rapid social change and its concomitant social complexities create new social environments which in turn, and quite naturally, give rise to new ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. . . . But the new ways do not register simultaneously and equally with all people. Some bitterly resent them; others violently resist them. Many are confused, fearful, and uncertain. . . . Some people would have the school ignore contemporary realities and stick to the transmission of time-tested ideas and values. Others feel that it should embrace what they perceive as a newly emerging culture. Some urge the school to become the agent for cultural renewal, the architect of a blueprint for a new society. Still others

> urge the school to behave as neutral observer, to serve as the referee or intellectual arbiter between the old and new ways. (Hurwitz, Jr. & Tesconi, Jr., 1973, pp. 7-8)

In view of the statement above, society as a whole espouses its own particular philosophy. However, with respect to educational philosophy at any given time, diversity is not only real, it has come to be expected in our present day and time. This indicates that the lay society is not going to be deterred regarding the school and its professed responsibility simply because its members do not overtly espouse any particular philosophical label. Nor should they be expected to blindly conform. After all, the members of this society are responding to current ideology with respect to their past experiences. Drawing from this past experience, these societal members are actively engaged in reflective thinking which influences reasoning; which is, after all, the essence of philosophy.

How then, is education to function in a society with numerous beliefs, values, and ideals that appear to have little congruency between them? Ultimately, the unifying aspect that might possibly hold together this apparent chaotic situation is the underlying principle to which direction may be found, namely philosophy (for a more thorough discussion of this concept see Munk, 1965). Even in the unlikely event that philosophy failed to provide direction or purpose, without it the unification of goals and aims would most assuredly be impossible. Therefore, it is necessary at this point to briefly discuss a few of the educational philosophies that have had an impact on our educational direction.

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

The lengthy writings and/or orations encountered by those researching the subject of educational philosophy are primarily concerned with justifying any given position as well as its application and consequences with respect to education. To do this would be beyond the scope of this writing, therefore the following philosophies will be presented as succinctly as possible with consideration given to only the underlying concepts which were used in determining the respective philosophy (with brief mention of methodologies).

Pragmatism, Experimentalism, and Instrumentalism

It would appear that all three of these terms involve different philosophies. Indeed, in reality there are philosophical assumptions associated with each, however, both experimentalism and instrumentalism are philosophies derived, for the most part, from methodologies utilized as a result of the pragmatic philosophy regarding education. For example, Dewey

> dethroned mind to the level of an instrument, conceiving it largely in biological terms as a means of adjustment. Similarly truth is regarded as that which works; acts which bring favorable consequences are true; and that which works can be determined by experimentation. (Munk, 1965, pp. 51-52)

Hurwitz, Jr. and Tesconi, Jr. (1973) describe both experimentalism and instrumentalism as follows:

> Experimentalism is the point of view that has been ascribed to John Dewey and others of his school of philosophy. In the field of general philosophy, it is based on what is called the pragmatic viewpoint. It is more commonly known as experimentalism as far as the implications for education are concerned. The word instrumentalism has sometimes been applied to it because of the stress upon the instrumental nature of the hypothesis or idea in assisting the human organism in solving its problems. (p. 20)

As long as the reader is cognizant of experimentalism and instrumentalism in terms of being primarily methodologies, I will try to briefly discuss the basic philosophical assumptions pertinent to pragmatism.

Quite simply, pragmatism is defined in Webster's Dictionary as being "concerned with the practical consequences of actions or beliefs" and also as "a practical approach to problems and affairs." (p. 544) The key word here is practical. As far as Dewey was concerned, there are, metaphysically speaking, problems which man may never be able to solve. Therefore, man should expend his energy on those problems of a "practical" nature that are applicable to his everyday existence, and not be overly concerned with those that are beyond his ability to solve, specifically those that are metaphysical in nature (Dewey, 1966). Basically, pragmatism is just that simple. Further discussion would be pertinent only for justifying Dewey's reasoning.

As stated previously, of the three—pragmatism, experimentalism, and instrumentalism—it is pragmatism that is the underlying philosophy, while the latter two are "philosophies" derived primarily from the specific

approach utilized in attaining the goals dictated by pragmatism.

Dewey was also associated with another philosophical movement prior to his becoming a pragmatist, that movement being progressivism. The philosophy of progressivism has a particular significance with respect to our present situation as the school's are still feeling its influence.

Progressivism

Unlike the pragmatist's approach to education with its accompanying descriptors, a discussion of progressivism will necessitate a slightly more descriptive account of its concepts. Munk (1965) describes progressivism as having both positive and negative aspects regarding education.

On the positive side there is an emphasis upon the learner rather than subject matter. This includes stressing the pupil's interests, natural development, and expression of ideas and desires. These interests must come naturally and spontaneously, therefore specific methodology is virtually nonexistent. There is also a strong emphasis upon learning through the senses which, according to Munk, leads toward anti-intellectualism. The teacher is regarded as a source of information while the student practices the concept of learning by doing (similar to pragmatists).

> In the desire not to be guilty of an arch sin against her view of democracy, the conscientious progressive teacher, nevertheless, takes far more precaution not impose her ideas on her pupils. The child must be left free to develop his creative capacities according to the demands of his own nature, genius, and normal inclinations. (p. 57)

The negative side of progressivism (again according to Munk) includes the following. Progressives adamantly avoid imposing their ideas, values, or beliefs on the student (it would appear that Munk is contradicting himself by including this aspect on the negative side while the quotation above presents this aspect as one he considers positive). However, Rogers (1967), in his "holistic" approach would consider this to be the only way to "facilitate" learning (this aspect will be discussed in more detail later). There is little stress on discipline as education should be an informal (natural) process for the purpose of nurturing creativity (although it is generally agreed that progressivism has seen its day in the schools, there is a renewed interest at present concerning creativity in human development; see Arasteh, 1976).

I am inclined to agree more with Pounds and Bryner (1967) as they approach progressivism under the title of "Educational Laissez-Faire." Their description is largely in agreement with Munk when they state that this philosophy emphasizes "self-creativity and individual growth." (p. 24) However, Pounds and Bryner avoid describing progressivism (laissez-faire) in either positive or negative terms. They also go on to point out that progressivism arose philosophically from the laissez-faire point of view. Both Munk, and Pounds and Bryner point to the decline of progressivism as a result of excesses regarding methodologies (or maybe a lack of "structured" methodologies) that were (or were not) employed for the purpose of realizing the philosophical principles associated with the movement. Munk goes on to state that Dewey left this movement for the

same reason.

There is at present a considerable amount of discussion regarding the "back-to-basics" movement. It may be that the reason for returning to this essentialistic philosophy is largely due to a revolt against progressivism.

Essentialism

It is with this philosophy that both Plato and Aristotle are associated. As opposed to the previously discussed philosophies, there is an emphasis upon the subject matter along with man's cultural heritage. Pounds and Bryner refer to essentialism as "humanism."

As far as the underlying principles of essentialism are concerned, there is little more to add (without pursuing the concepts of idealism and realism which is beyond our purpose herein). The implications concerning methodologies however, are important, as they are in sharp contrast to those previously mentioned.

Obviously, since the emphasis is upon the permanent rather than the changing, the essentialists hold that there are certain unchanging factors which must be pursued (quite opposed to Dewey's pragmatism). This of course dictates an approach utilizing subject matter derived from the great minds of the past—the "classics"—if you will. At the same time, the study of these classics will embrace the accompanying principle regarding man's cultural heritage. Hocking (1929) states that education is two-fold: "teaching the young the best that their own particular group has to offer,

but, at the same time, leading them to look beyond their own culture to the total experience of mankind through the centuries." (Munk, 1956, pp. 58-59).

Existentialism

The underlying philosophy of existentialism is not particularly difficult to understand, but rather it is the evasive logic utilized by some existentialists that provides the difficulty in understanding the concepts espoused by them. This may be witnessed by the contradictory thinking even among existentialists (Kaufmann, 1956).

Existentialism has its roots in theology whereby it tried to explain the nature of religion in a world that suddenly found scientific investigation with its subsequent explanations do away with logic. However, existentialism has since split into two camps: one being theistic, the other being nontheistic, or atheistic.

The underlying principle of existentialism is one that appears to encourage contradiction. For example, Munk (1965), in comparing them to the personalists, finds that the existentialists "are much more subjective; they have far less regard for reason and for science; and some of them (especially Heidegger and Sartre) tend to stress the tragic and the irrational aspects of experience." (pp. 77-78)

The existentialists argue that man must pursue his "existence." In doing so "we first recognize we exist; we then choose; and then we develop into the 'essence' (or nature) of our choice." (Pounds & Bryner, 1967, p. 25).

Although the existentialists espouse no particular methodology, their philosophy does have methodological implications for education. To begin with, there is no meaning outside a man's effort to "find himself." This then, according to the existentialist, involves the concept of choice. Once made, the existentialist "accept[s] his responsibility to live according with his particular choice." (Pounds & Bryner, 1967, p. 25) This implies individual uniqueness which, in turn, influences particular educational methodology. The existentialist is concerned with those elements of the curriculum that will nurture creativity, and which will provide the individual with the capacity to look honestly at the tragic aspects of life. With this in mind, the humanities would be high on the scale whereas the sciences would be at the bottom if they were indeed at all included. For the existentialist "the highest goal of education must always and everywhere be kept in mind, namely, 'man's search for himself.'" (Munk, 1965, p. 78)

Authoritarianism

(I mention this philosophy primarily for the purpose of emphasizing that once again educational philosophy is necessarily accompanied by a respective methodology.)

Authoritarianism is rather simple and straightforward. It is divided into religious and secular camps, each of which may be subdivided. For example, religious authoritarianism may be subdivided into Roman Catholocism and Protestant Fundamentalism. On the secular side there may be subdivisions

taking the form of fascism or communism. Regardless of the subdivision with its respective title, all of these adhere to the principle of authority, stressing discipline and indoctrination.

Other Types

I probably would exaggerate little in stating that "there are as many philosophies as there are 'isms,'" (J. T. Gates, 1981, statement made during class lecture—University of Alabama) all of which cannot possibly be included within the scope of this writing. Therefore, I will mention a few more only in passing. For the most part the philosophies mentioned in this section utilize one or more of the methodologies previously described.

Social Evolutionism. The social evolutionists hold that man's evolutionary development should be basic to the school's function. In view of this, the values to be stressed in the school are those obtained from history. "The values lie in the preservation of those things that have been validated through their success in man's previous history." (Pounds & Bryner, 1967, p. 15) Therefore, those values that have been established in man's previous history are those that should continue to be taught in the school. The social evolutionists maintain that change occurs, but only over long periods of time; therefore the school should endorse only those changes that have proven (through the test of time) to be of value. Subsequently, this point of view holds that the school should reinforce established values and has no business appropriating societal change. The methodology

implied is largely that of indoctrination.

Social Realism. This philosophy is closely related to social evolutionism. While it incorporates the underlying principles of social evolutionism, it does go one step further. The social realists recognize the existence of a changing world. Therefore it is necessary for the school to keep up with these changes and teach "whatever values may become predominant at different times in our culture." (Pounds & Bryner, 1967, p. 18) There is however, one other important aspect of this philosophy that needs to be mentioned at this point.

Pounds and Bryner point out that in preparing students to face an ever changing world, the use of presently predominating values are likely to change in a few years. This leaves those that were taught according to these specific values with the possibility of trying to function in a world that no longer endorses the specific values by which the former student was taught. It would appear that social realism has some affiliation with those concepts underlying progressivism while utilizing methodologies incorporating indoctrination as well as those whimsical methodologies that come and go.

Reconstructionism. With reconstructionism the circle is complete. The social evolutionists stress the values handed down through history, the social realists stress the presently predominating values, and the reconstructionists stress the school's responsibility for changing (molding) society. The reconstructionist s feel that the curriculum should be set up in a way through which the present conditions and trends in society

(implying societal problems) may be solved in the best manner possible. Basically, the reconstructionists hold that the school should form the "blueprint of the new society." (Pounds & Bryner, 1967, p. 23) The questions arise as to who determines these best solutions; what are the present conditions and trends; are these conditions and trends viewed from the standpoint of society as a whole, or are they viewed from the standpoint of the "fadish" conditions and trends often influencing the student's "society" through which he or she "perceives" the whole society; or, what will be the elements of the "new society"? This would appear to have some tinge of authoritarianism devoid of its specific methodologies. However, in all fairness to the reconstructionists, they do endorse the presentation of arguments from other sides. The solutions derived from these arguments are those from which the student may either choose to accept as pertinent to a new society, or else reject them altogether in hopes of finding even better solutions. The methodology implied here is not unlike Kohlberg's dilemma situations or the process of values clarification (both of which will be discussed later). However, the question then arises as to the relevancy of the proposed solutions. Does the high school student indeed have sufficient knowledge and experience to equally weigh all aspects of the problem with clinical objectivity? It is this objectivity that is of prime importance to the reconstructionist as emphasis is placed on the scientific method throughout the curriculum.

The types of questions presented in this section are the types that have plagued values education to the point that its acceptance has yet to

be overwhelmingly endorsed in the school setting. Although reconstructionism is not specifically referred to as "values education," and although values education does not specifically endorse the pursuit of a "new society," the methodologies are quite similar.

Eclectic Point of View. Very briefly, the eclectic point of view is more or less a "catch-all." To state that it espouses a particular philosophy would be misleading. It rather is simply a label applied to those that do not specifically fall within one of the other philosophies previously discussed. It endorses no particular philosophy, but draws from all of them (in this sense it may be stated that all of the philosophies presented are eclectic since they also draw from others; in other words, the philosophies that have been discussed, overlap in many ways). Neither does this point of view endorse any particular methodology. It has been included merely to emphasize the fact that educational philosophy is not simply a matter of an either-or situation.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion of educational philosophy reveals two items that require mention at this point. First, it can be seen that educational philosophy is no stranger to diversity. Second, it is obvious that educational philosophy is accompanied by respective methodology. It is with the second point that I am primarily concerned herein.

It is quite possible to state a philosophy with no reference given to particular methodology. For example, Butler (1968) describes four main

divisions of philosophy: metaphysics; logic; epistemology; and axiology. It is indeed likely that a statement concerning a metaphysical principle (or a principle relative to any of the other three divisions) could be made devoid of any particular methodology; unless the author of such statement desires that the principle be taught. Here we come to the crux of the matter, namely, the teaching of a particular philosophy.

The use of the term "educational" as a descriptor of the type of philosophy with which the schools are associated must now be defined. Webster's Dictionary defines educational as "a field of knowledge dealing with technical aspects of teaching." (p. 231) The combination of these "technical aspects" are those from which specific methodologies are derived. In light of this, it becomes obvious why educational philosophy must necessarily be accompanied by methodology. Subsequently, I believe it is safe to say that it would not be possible to simply state an educational philosophy devoid of specific methodology.

Having briefly discussed the "what" with respect to educational philosophy, I believe it is now necessary to investigate how the field of education arrives, in part, at any given methodology (or "how"). Therefore, the discussion will now turn to psychology, which has espoused numerous developmental theories that play an important role in helping education understand how children learn. This understanding, in turn, has a great influence upon methodology.

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES

Eson (1972) lists eleven different psychological headings which are useful in locating pertinent material. The discussion herein will include only one of these areas: developmental psychology. However, for the purpose of this writing, I will include some aspects of social development as well as moral development under this heading (in reality these two headings would more properly fit under social psychology). This is not to say that other areas such as educational psychology, clinical psychology, and personality development have little value regarding the present discussion, but time and occassion have necessarily required their omission herein.

Developmental psychology (with the aforementioned tangents) has been chosen with respect to the present task (regarding the manner through which education derives methodology) because, as Bruner (1966) states regarding developmental psychology,

> Instruction is, after all, an effort to assist or to shape growth. In devising instruction for the young, one would be ill advised indeed to ignore what is known about growth, its constraints and opportunities. And a theory of instruction . . . is in effect a theory of how growth and development are assisted by diverse means. (p. 1)

Eson (1972) also states that "educational theory is likely to be unrealistic unless it is anchored in developmental theory." (p. 11) Social development along with moral development has been included primarily because a dis-

cussion of values would be virtually impossible without them. Other reasons for their inclusion are, 1) it is through social interaction that humans acquire human qualities (Asch, 1952; Eson, 1972); 2) the school is indeed an institution whereby values are transmitted (Goslin, 1965); and 3) "because instruction in school takes place in a group setting, it is important for the teacher to understand how the individual is affected by the group structure." (Goslin, p. 18)

Due to the delimiting process, the discussion regarding developmental psychology will be concerned with only cognitive development.

Developmental Psychology

As stated, the approach herein regarding developmental psychology will be concerned with only the cognitive aspect. I have chosen to very briefly review those cognitive theories that appear to have had an influence on education. The reader will undoubtedly question the inclusion of some of them with respect to the exclusion of others (that he or she may feel are more pertinent). To this I acquiesce, however, in order to satisfy everyone, this writing would probably never end.

Jean Piaget

Piaget's theory is largely biological. In terms of the child's physical environment, Piaget utilizes the terms assimilation, and accommodation. Both of these terms are used to imply a process of change. Assimilation being an adaptation of the environment to fit the person, while accommodation is an adaptation of the person to fit the environment

(Forman & Sigel, 1979). Eson (1972) describes assimilation as play, and accommodation as imitation. He also goes on to state a third aspect, that of equilibration, whereby "the structure or the schemes change from one state to another." (p. 97)

According to Piaget, there are four stages of development: the sensorimotor stage (birth to 2 years); the preoperational stage (2 to 7 years); the concrete-operational stage (7 to 11 years); and the formal-operational stage (beyond the 11th year). Eson separates the pre-operational stage into two different stages: the symbolic or preconceptual development of thought (2 to 4 years); and the period of intuitive thought (4 to 7 years). This discussion will approach the preoperational stage as a whole.

Essentially, the sensorimotor stage is characterized by three main functions (although not discussed herein, Eson lists a fourth, that of objectification of time). First, the development of "object permanence" involves the child's ability to relate to objects that are not "visually" present. For example, when a ball rolls behind a box and subsequently out of sight, the young child will no longer regard the ball as existing (out of sight, out of mind; Asch, 1952). Therefore, the child's attention will immediately be concentrated elsewhere. However, once this "object permanence" is established, the child will know that the ball continues to exist even though it can no longer be seen. This capacity leads directly to the next function, that of "coordinated space" (Eson, 1972). Because the child is aware the ball still exists even though it is not

seen, the child will make some type of movement to retrieve the ball. This movement, in turn, serves to acquaint the child with its immediate surroundings, including the child's own body. This movement is translated in terms of detour, negation, and reciprocity (for a more detailed discussion of these terms, see Forman & Sigel, 1979).

A final characteristic of the sensorimotor stage is that of "object causality" (Eson, 1972). It is here that the child perceives a particular action as having an affect on some object. For example, throwing a ball causes it to roll. Subsequently, this action (rolling) is associated with the cause of the action (throwing). The fact that the object is spherical matters not, therefore, for a period of time, the child may throw objects of various shapes aware that this action caused a previous object to roll.

The preoperational stage begins around age 2, and includes symbolic thought ("the use of mental images and words to represent actions and entire events that are not present." Forman & Sigel, 1979, p. 20). The child at this stage can anticipate the effect of one action on another action, what Piaget terms a "function." However, this "function" is a one-way relation and can be either direct or inverse. Because it precedes logical thought (or operation) it is called preoperational. The child at this stage can be easily deceived by appearance. Forman and Sigel (1979) describe this one-way relation (or function) most admirably:

> You and we know that, if you push a blob of spinach into a compact heap, what the heap gains in height is exactly compensated by what the blob lost in circumference.

> In Piaget's terms, the quantity of substance is conserved despite changes in spatial distribution. When the 4-year old looks down at the reduced circumference of her portion of spinach, she thinks that she has less to eat. (She may also think that she has more to eat, if she concentrates instead on the increased height of her portion of spinach.) Now this child may well understand that a decrease in circumference leads to an increase in height and vice versa. But she can think about these functions in one direction at a time only; she cannot integrate the two directions into a mental structure that has applications for conservation of quantity. Her failure to make this mental integration leaves her open to errors of perception, such as thinking that she has more (or less) spinach to swallow. This inability is not surprising when you think that the child has just learned the function, which involves the coordination of two changes. (p. 21)

Because the child is concerned only with appearance regarding the final product, Piaget has termed this type of knowledge as being "figurative." Piaget terms "operational" knowledge as being characterized by thought concerning the transformation in addition to the appearance of the final product (Forman & Sigel, 1979).

As with the preoperational stage, the concrete-operational stage is self descriptive. The term "concrete" refers to objects to which the children are still associated, while the term "operational" implies that the child has reached a level of thinking whereby he or she can deal with both transformation and static states simultaneously. These children are also capable of dealing with abstract concepts, although they are dealt

with in a concrete manner.

Referring to the spinach example, the concrete-operational child will understand that the quantity is the same simply by pressing the spinach heap to its original height and circumference. "This child can now see the implication behind the physical reversal, because he or she has the mental ability to think about the two functions as variations of each other." (Forman & Sigel, 1979, p. 26) The important implications for education are that the "facts" are approached as concrete rather than abstract.

Inhelder and Piaget (1958) place the student who is capable of truly abstract thought in the formal-operational stage. For example, the student exhibits the ability to "perform operations on other operations, such as a multiplication of a multiplication." (Forman & Sigel, p. 26) Eson (1972) describes the formal-operational stage thusly:

> The adolescent shows a particular orientation to problem solving. By setting up at least a partial combinatorial analysis, he organizes his approach to the problem before he attempts a specific empirical test. He isolates and attempts to control the relevant variables and he seeks logical justification and verifications of his solutions. (p. 114)

Piaget's theory has been taken one step further by Kennedy (1974). He states that there is a metatheoretical stage beyond the formal-operational stage. It is in this stage that people begin to question the validity of the questions themselves to determine if they are indeed empirically

solvable.

Jerome Bruner

Bruner's theory emphasizes the importance of a child's representational acts, and consists of a development process that becomes more and more complex. This process is described by the use of representational modes.

The first mode is that of enactive representation. Here the child develops a particular pattern of action such as "grasp-and-lift an object." (Forman & Sigel, 1979, p. 36) This action pattern becomes so well practiced that it combines with, or even substitutes for, other motor patterns, e. g., "the grasp-and-push, when the habitual unit does not cause the desired result." (Forman & Sigel, p. 36) Therefore the first mode is representation by action that is exhibited as being habitual.

The second mode is referred to as ikonic representation. In this mode representation is in the form of images such as a picture. In describing this mental image (ikon), Bruner, Olver, and Greenfield (1966) state the following:

> We ask him to tell us the fifty states of the Union. If he "reads out" in this order "Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont . . . ," we can guess that the supporting representation for his recital is spatial. If the order is "Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California . . . ," the support is inferred to be more list-like, ordered by an alphabetic rule. (p. 7)

As can be seen in the example above, the first method of answering the question would be one that would probably make use of a mental image (in this case a map).

The final mode is that of symbolic representation. Here the child makes use of language in some form to represent objects and ideas. This is regarded as the most advanced level of representation because the "symbol, unlike the ikon, does not bear any resemblance to the object it represents." (Forman & Sigel, 1979, p. 37) This, of course requires thinking on an abstract level.

Forman and Sigel (1979) point out one important aspect with respect to representation and cognitive development, namely, conflict. When the different representational modes combine in a conflicting manner, mental dissonance results. Since the child (and everyone else for that matter) prefers an existence of mental harmony (consonance), this dissonance will cause the child to rethink the problem in order to once again obtain this mental harmony. To do so will require some form of development which will also result in intellectual progress.

Robert Gagné

Cognitive development, according to Gagné, is cumulative learning. This necessitates the acquisition of simple skills from which new and more complex skills are acquired as a result of combining the previously acquired skills. In other words, prerequisite skills are essential to Gagné's theory. Gagné emphasizes this with respect to specific skills

required to solve a particular problem (Gagné, 1970). Accordingly, he lists eight types of learning that are sequential and prerequisiste in nature, i. e., mastery of the lower level skill is necessary before mastery of any subsequent skill can be accomplished.

The first type of learning is referred to as signal learning, whereby a particular stimulus usually signals the occurrence of a certain event. This is followed by stimulus-response learning in which a particular response is made with respect to a particular signal. Motor chaining and verbal association are described by Forman and Sigel (1979) as

> sequences of stimulus-response associations. The hustle, a one-time craze of discotheques, is a sequence (a chain) of motor responses. The sentence "Let's do the hustle" is a sequence of words (verbal association)—that is, words chained together. Learning a verbal chain is far simpler than understanding the meaning of the verbal chain and is, therefore, a lower form of learning. The 4-year-old may be able to repeat the sentence "Let's do the hustle" as a verbal chain, without having the slightest ideas of what the sentence means.
>
> The child who does understand the meaning of the verbal chain exhibits still higher forms of learning. (p. 40)

Discrimination learning, as the name implies, is a type of learning whereby the child distinguishes different things that at first appear to be the same, and subsequently differ the responses respectively. Concept learning cannot be adequately described in a brief sentence due to its complex nature. It is an abstract type of learning obviously concerning concepts. Due to its complexity coupled with the inadequate

amount of space that can be alloted for a discussion herein, the reader is referred to Forman and Sigel (1979), Gagné (1970), and for experimental research see Kendler and Kendler (1959). Rule learning involves the organization of several concepts. However, the emphasis is on understanding the rules rather than on memorizing them. Failure to do so would result in learning only a verbal chain. The most complex of the eight learning types is that of problem solving. It involves all of the other types that serve as prerequisites. Not only does it involve the combination of rules (which, of course, involves the combination of concepts and so forth), but it involves combining them in such a manner as to fit a particular situation. This might require the changing or bending of specific rules in order to solve the problem.

Gagné's theory has particular implications for education. For example, failure of the student to perform on one level of learning means that the student is deficient on some prerequisite level. The task then, is to determine which level is the one that is deficient, correct the deficiency, and then proceed with an "enlightened" student. Of course there may be deficiencies exhibited on more than one level.

Sidney Bijou and Donald Baer

Unlike the theories of Piaget, Bruner, and Gagné, which are concerned primarily with complex biological and mental processes, Bijou and Baer (1961) base their theory on the observable environmental events that determine behavior. Psychological development, according to these two,

consists of "progressive changes in the way an organism's behavior interacts with the environment." (p. 1) Forman and Sigel (1979) describe behavior, with respect to this theory, as a function of stimulus events from which the term functional analysis is derived.

It is interesting to note that one of the underlying principles of this theory correlates directly with the philosophy of Plato. For example, Plato states that throughout life, man continually seeks those things that provide or produce pleasure (the opposite, of course, being pain, something man continually strives to avoid). In line with this thinking, Bijou and Baer make use of the terms "reinforcers" and "discriminative stimuli." The correlation between Plato's philosophy, and Bijou and Baer's theory can be seen in this description of the terms reinforcers and discriminative stimuli as given by Forman and Sigel (1979):

> Those stimulus events that come after a response and increase the likelihood of the response are called reinforcers. If I chuck the baby under her chin each time she smiles at me and if I notice that she begins to smile more often as I continue to chuck her each time she smiles, I can be fairly confident that chucking is reinforcing. Discriminative stimuli are those stimulus events that occur before a response and signal an opportunity for reinforcement—that is, they signal the time to make a particular response in order to bring about a particular consequence. To the baby the sound of mother's footsteps signals the best time to cry in order to be gently rocked. Crying at other times doesn't lead as quickly to the same consequence. The footsteps

don't reinforce crying; they signal when to cry. (p. 46)

The term operant is used to describe whether or not the child's response operates on the environment in achieving the desired results.

There are two stages of development described by Bijou and Baer. The first is referred to as the universal stage (first 18 months of life). Here the child learns to coordinate his or her body in order to act upon, or manipulate, his or her environment. Thus, the movements that provide success increase while those that result in failure decrease. Therefore, development is seen as a continuing process. The second stage (1½ years to 6 years) is called the basic stage. It is in this stage that the child learns certain social responses with respect to other people. The responses learned during this stage will influence the personality of the individual for years to come.

> Children who receive approval for small portions of their bids for acceptance will develop personality types quite different from those of children who are consistently reinforced for almost every bid. Development is a function of the reinforcement history of each individual child. (Forman & Sigel, 1979, p. 47)

Conclusion

Other theories that will not be included herein, but nevertheless are important, are those attributed to Heinz Werner (based on biological function); and David Klahr and J. G. Wallace (whose theory makes use of information processing, not unlike task analysis, however much more complex).

It must be noted here, that the extreme brevity afforded each theory previously described did little justice to their validity. This would be an impossible task due to their extreme complexity.

Finally, and most importantly for education, it can be seen, as disclosed by these theories, that different age groups function on different levels of learning (as well as cognition). Although this is a rather accepted conclusion, it appears that educational methodology sometimes overlooks this.

Social Development

The third and final section of this writing brings us to its motivating principle—the teaching of values. It has been included in this section because, as shall be disclosed, values are intrinsically social. Moral development has been included because they too are socially nurtured. I will begin this section with an attempt to define values.

Values

Rokeach (1968) differentiates between values, attitudes, and beliefs in a hierarchical manner. This means that it would require the combination of two or more beliefs to form an attitude, two or more attitudes are combined to form a value, and two or more values are combined to form value systems. He states that attitudes and beliefs may be stated, but they do not necessarily result in action. Values, on the other hand, dictate action.

Morrill (1980) also refers to values as being action, or conduct,

oriented. In his definition of values (which this writer found to be among the best available), Morrill concludes that values are a set of internalized adaptations from which appropriate conduct (implying social influence) is realized.

On the other hand, Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1966) refer to the valuing process which includes seven steps within three divisions:

Choosing

1. Seeking alternatives when faced with a choice.
2. Looking ahead to probable consequences before choosing.
3. Making choices on one's own, without depending on others.

Prizing

4. Being aware of one's own preferences and valuations.
5. Being willing to affirm one's choices publicly.

Acting

6. Acting in ways that are consistent with choices and preferences.
7. Acting in those ways repeatedly with a pattern to one's life.

As can be seen, the valuing process is consistent with both Rokeach and Morrill, in that it also ends in action.

At this point, I must briefly digress and discuss internalization. Internalization has to do with the consequences that have been reinforced or punished by society (including family or home) for particular actions on the part of the individual. Piaget describes two levels of development

during which these consequences are internalized. The first level, "heteronomous morality of constraint," is one in which the child equates good with adult rule. Here authority is equivalent to justice. On the second level, "autonomous morality of cooperation," the individual develops a sense of social responsibility. The actions on this level are socially dictated. This means that the individual will act, or refrain from action, depending upon societal constraints (Eson, 1972). It is this autonomous level in which values have been internalized. Asch (1952) describes the process thusly:

> Right and wrong, it is asserted, have initially only one meaning: they are what adults reward and punish. Eventually these learned reactions are said to take deeper root; the child acts with the punishments of adults in mind even when they are not around. This is considered a crucial step in development, marking the formation of an 'internalized inhibitory process' that anticipates future punishment. Indeed, many equate this result with becoming socialized, describing conscience as 'anticipatory anxiety.' (p. 355)

Subsequently, it can be said, values consist of those internalized data that dictate conduct.

In 1951, the Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association (NEA) in conjunction with the American Association of School Administrators (AASA) reported their findings relative to the teaching of values in a book entitled Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools. This commission strongly endorsed the overt teaching of values in the

schools. Of course the values to be taught were those espoused by the commission, values which today's society would consider to be archaic. The report reflects those attitudes, beliefs, and values that were held by the society at the time of its publication—1951. Obviously, society, and with it, education, have changed considerably in the last thirty years. Pluralism has taken a strong hold, therefore the teaching of those values espoused by only the dominant ethnic group in our society can no longer be regarded as the only "proper" values in existence. However, the teaching of values is still a subject that concerns many who wish to see values overtly taught in the schools. Subsequently, education has turned to various methodologies for the purpose of teaching values non-judgmentally.

Teaching Values

In the past, teaching values was a fairly simple task, it simply was done. Values were taught in virtually every facet of the school. An interesting example of the dissemination of values can be seen in the following set of rules established in 1915 for female teachers:

1. You are not to keep company with men.
2. You must be home between the hours of 8 P.M. and 6 A.M., unless attending a school function.
3. You may not loiter downtown in ice cream stores.
4. You many not travel beyond the city limits, unless you have permission of the chairman of the board.
5. You may not ride in a carriage or automobile with any man, unless he is your father or brother.

6. You may not smoke cigarettes.
7. You may not dress in bright colors.
8. You may under no circumstances dye your hair.
9. You must wear at least two petticoats.
10. Your dresses must not be any shorter than two inches above the ankle.
11. To keep the school room neat and clean, you must: sweep the floor at least once daily; scrub the floor at least once a week with hot soapy water; clean the blackboards at least once a day; and start the fire at 7 A.M. so the room will be warm by 8 A.M. (Forisha & Forisha, 1976, p. 18)

With the onset of the civil rights movement in the 1950's and '60's, society's naiveté regarding value teaching was radically brought to the attention of educational institutions. As stated earlier, no longer was the teaching of one set of values, considered by the dominant ethnic group to be the "proper" set of values to which all other ethnic groups (minorities) should adhere, going to be acceptable. Subsequently, education found it was more convenient to simply ignore the issue of value teaching rather than face its eventual controversy. However, certain aspects (as stated in the Introduction), have alarmed and alerted society into pressuring education to once again assume the responsibility for teaching values. Scriven (1975) has divided the proponents of values education into three categories:

1. The affectivists who believe that moral education should emphasize feeling, affect, and attitude, using techniques such as role-playing and the presentation of adult models. For them, it is the area of affect which links one's knowledge of rules

to one's behavior.

2. The developmentalists who believe in the moral development stages of the child. Therefore, no single treatment of a moral problem can have any consequence on a group of students if the likely possibility is true that different members of the group are on different levels of moral reasoning.
3. The cognitivists who believe that a curriculum which provides moral reasoning and analysis skills should be emphasized over the affective aspects of moral education.

The two most prominent approaches to values education are combinations of Scriven's three categories. Those emphasizing values clarification are affectivist-cognitivist, while those following the theory of stages of moral development are developmentalist-cognitivists. (Goldbecker, 1976, p. 10)

In line with these two approaches, I will examine first Kohlberg's approach to moral development followed by Rath's values clarification approach.

Moral Development

In describing Kohlberg's theory of moral development, Lower and Winsor (1980) state that Kohlberg stresses developing a higher sense of moral responsibility. For the teacher this requires determining the student's present level of development as well as being able to direct the student to next higher level. The levels and stages of Kohlberg's developmental theory are as follows:

1. Preconventional level

At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but

interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exhange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrument-relevant orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude or justice.

II. Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy—nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention—"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level.

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level also has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and con-

tract is the binding elements of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. (Lower & Winsor, 1980, p. 11)

Kohlberg's theory has not been received without criticism. To begin with, Kohlberg's theory is based on "justice." However, the critics question "whose justice." By this the critics imply that it is doubtful Kohlberg's claim to universality regarding his theory is legitimate due to cultural diversity (Forman & Sigel, 1979). Peters (1975) points out that Kohlberg has neglected the affective aspects of moral development with no concern given to the emotions (in this respect I must defend Kohlberg because he does state that his is a cognitive developmental theory; therefore Peters' criticism is somewhat unfounded). Stone (1974) points to a contradiction in Kohlberg's theory with respect to his philosophy. Kohlberg's philosophy acknowledges the fact that the environment has an influence on development. This environment necessarily includes adults such as parents and teachers. Yet Kohlberg states that moral growth can occur devoid of adult influence! My own criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that it appears

to be overly preoccupied with determining the student's developmental levels rather than teaching values. In this respect, Kurtines and Greif (1974) found a lack of evidence regarding reliability and validity with respect to his measuring instrument.

Values Clarification

According to Goldbecker (1976), values clarification emphasizes affective learning. This learning is achieved through the "valuing process" (see p. 32) which aids in clarifying already existing values. Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum (1972) list 79 strategies that may be used in the classroom in facilitating this valuing process. In the situation outlined, the teacher should actively participate in the discussion without dominating it. This is important because of the "internalizing process" (discussed earlier, see pp. 32-33). Jarolimek (1973) equates values clarification with socialization (socialization in this sense may be equated with internalization). Because the teacher (or adult) is actively involved in the process, adult values will at least be exposed to the student, who, because of society, is being exposed less and less to adult (particularly of a parental nature) influence (which ultimately affects internalization).

Kirschenbaum (1977) lists nine reasons for supporting values clarification: 1) it contains practical strategies; 2) it is consistent with a democratic, pluralistic society; 3) it is easy to get started; 4) there is no loss to subject matter; 5) it presents a variety of issues; 6) there is

no danger involved; 7) research is supporting; 8) it can be used with all ability levels; and 9) it can be combined with other approaches.

For the most part, values clarification is enjoying increasingly widespread acceptance due largely to its ease of facilitation. This is an unfortunate basis for unquestioning acceptance. Too often, educational methodology has been determined and implemented because of convenience rather than appropriateness.

As with Kohlberg's theory, values clarification also has its critics. The most vocal among them appears to be Lockwood (1977). He finds fault with the values clarification approach in numerous areas:

1. the definition and theory of values clarification;
2. the characterization of values clarification as a treatment process much like client-centered therapy that treats emotional needs rather than value needs; and
3. the tendancy of values clarification to teach ethical relativism to children by presenting all values as equally valid. (Goldbecker, 1976, p. 15)

In addition, Lockwood also feels that the values clarification approach infringes upon the student's right to privacy. Stewart (1975) echoes Lockwood's sentiments by stating that the open disclosure of values leaves the student vulnerable to criticism from his or her peers (this concept is discussed in-depth in Derlega & Chaikin, 1975).

Organismic Approach

Rogers (1967) advocates the "facilitation of learning" rather than

mere teaching. He emphasizes the positive aspect of man. According to Rogers, when man has come to realize his "inner core," which is naturally positive, "he acts in a way which is eventually both self-enhancing as well as socially constructive." (Forisha & Forisha, 1976, p. 47)

This approach has its roots in progressivism whereby the teacher or facilitator is primarily a source of information. Its application in education has not been as widespread as that of values clarification due largely to its impracticality in the classroom situation (here again educational methodology is preoccupied with convenience, however, in this instance it is probably justified since Roger's approach requires a one-on-one situation, something that is not usually possible in the classroom).

Conclusion

As can be seen, education is in the process of turning to the non-judgemental teaching of values. This would appear to be a logical direction, especially in light of pluralism. However, as stated, education must adopt or adapt methodologies with respect to specific purposes. The use of methodologies simply for convenience, or ease of facilitation, must not be tolerated. The approaches discussed all have merit, however, the criticisms that accompany them must be considered. Hopefully, the final result will be worth the effort.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this writing was to review educational philosophy and developmental psychology mindful of methodology. As can be seen, education is presently in the midst of a Kohlbergian dilemma regarding the teaching of values. Society, frustrated by reports of declining morality, viewed in terms of sexual promiscuity, high crime rates, interracial conflict, etc., has a tendency to to blame the schools for the present situation of our moral decadence.

Unfortunately, society has failed, or better yet simply refused, to recognize its own responsibility outside the school. Increasingly shorter sentences for convicted criminal behavior, parental indulgence regarding an offspring's deviant behavior ("boys will be boys" so to speak), open acceptance of unwed teenage pregnancy, split family influence, etc. It must be stressed, in defense of education, that the home has a five or six year headstart on determining behavior before the school is afforded that opportunity. Subsequently, <u>all</u> of the complaints leveled at the schools are not truly justified; however, many are.

The schools, in recognizing its responsibility as public institutions, are trying to respond to the charges leveled by society. However, as mentioned throughout this writing, the aspect of pluralism has complicated the issue of values teaching. Subsequently, past methodology that was useful in a homogeneous society is no longer practical in our ever increasing heterogeneous culture. Therefore, new methodologies are being substituted through which values are being approached in a clinical,

non-judgmental nature. However, at present, further research is needed to substantiate the validity of these approaches.

Finally, I come to the one person who will influence the student only slightly less than the parent, namely, the teacher. Unfortunately, too often the teacher has been regarded by education, society, and with respect to the approaches previously mentioned, as being a sterile source of information. It appears that this sterility is an aspect of convenience on the part of some theorists and/or philosophers (especially with regard to those adhering to the philosophy of progressivism). Nothing more could be further from the truth. The teacher, being a member of society, has internalized the same values that he or she is presenting to his or her charges. To assume that the teacher does not convey these values, either explicitly or implicitly on a daily basis in each of his or her classes, would be absurd.

In closing, I regret that numerous items discussed herein were done so on an extremely superficial basis. Therefore, a bibliography has been included in place of a reference list, mindful of those that may desire further study regarding this topic. All of the references may be found in this list as well as many other writings that were originally to be included within the scope of this writing. However, time necessitated an early ending to this project. It is hoped that the reader will find time to pursue some of the ideas contained in the writings listed in the bibliography.

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